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The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the hub of 
global policy innovation and diffusion. It is the only univer-
sally representative body where all member states enjoy 
equal status and openly exercise their voting preferences as a 
sovereign entity. Between 2001 and 2017, total 1,284 resolu-
tions were adopted by recorded/roll-call votes at the UNGA 
where each state revealed its preference by agreeing, (yes), 
disagreeing (nay), or abstaining from voting. Although these 
resolutions are non-binding, hence considered as “inconse-
quential,” the platform remains a unique source to observe 
and compare the relative policy positions of essentially every 
member state in the same institutional setting. The voting 
preferences may not entirely be a “true” reflection of the 
“mind” of a state, and this is because voting at UNGA 
depends at times on a member state’s strategic agenda and 
influences key global and regional actors exert. However, the 
non-binding nature of the UNGA resolutions suggests that 
“strategic voting” is a less common phenomenon compared 
with the binding votes in the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) (Bailey et al., 2017, p. 437). Translating voting pref-
erences into actions entails cost-benefit analysis and the 
capacity of the state. There are inherent distortions in con-
verting states’ preferences into behaviour. Thus, preferences 
and interest similarity among pairs of states (dyads) expressed 
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Abstract
This article explores Bangladesh’s voting coincidences at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with China, 
India, Russia, and the United States for the period 2001–2017 to draw inferences about country’s political proximity and 
policy preferences on global issues. Although Bangladesh’s voting coincidence shifted from China toward India since 2013, 
country’s “opposite” votes with India remained 3 times higher compared with that of China, suggesting that the post-2013 
change in voting coincidence is more about the types and content of the resolutions and not fundamental. Bangladesh 
maintained a principled position on disarmament, conventional arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and prohibition of 
chemical weapons resolutions, which are greatly at odds with India and China. Such voting coherency suggests that the 
small developing countries can maintain a higher level of voting consistency on issues that are of great interest to them. 
However, Bangladesh’s voting inconstancy in the country-specific human rights resolutions reflects a selective adherence 
to the policy of non-interference, particularly with respect to neighbors. Bangladesh’s voting records on the human rights 
situation in Myanmar, reveals that it joined the majority member states condemning Myanmar only when the resolutions 
started mentioning Bangladesh as an affected country. Although the voting coincidence alone may not capture the whole 
dynamics of a state’s leanings, this article has revealed that systematic research of UNGA voting records has the capacity to 
add to the knowledge of political proximity and policy preferences of states in terms of the way they weigh their choices and 
chart their path through idealism and opportunism.
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in the Assembly sessions must be interpreted with caution. 
States’ voting preferences at the UNGA, thus, reflect their 
unique policy preferences—arrived at either as an expression 
of commitment to certain fundamental values, influenced by 
strategic needs or a combination of both (Kim & Russett, 
1996, p. 629; Rai, 1972, p. 394).
The UNGA voting records of developing countries like 
Bangladesh has received far less attention by the interna-
tional relations (IR) scholars. To fill this gap in the litera-
ture, this article analyses Bangladesh’s voting coincidences 
with China and India—two regional players—and Russia 
and the United States—two extra-regional players—for the 
period 2001–2017. It explores the variations/consistency in 
Bangladesh’s voting preferences, analyze Bangladesh’s vot-
ing preference in different thematic issues including the 
country-specific resolutions on human rights (HR) situa-
tions. The findings demonstrate the usefulness of analyzing 
the UNGA voting record as a tool of assessing Bangladesh’s 
ideological and strategic preferences and highlight her pol-
icy inclinations and political proximity with China, India, 
Russia, and the United States.
Theoretical and Conceptual Debate: 
UNGA Voting Records of Developing 
Countries
The conceptual framework underlying the use of UNGA vot-
ing records to assess states’ policy preferences and political 
proximity is contested. A sole focus on the voting records as 
a “microcosm for world politics” offers little justification to 
comprehend the dynamics of states’ preferences and policy 
inclinations (Dixon, 1981; Keohane, 1967; Riggs et al., 
1970; Voeten, 2013). Nevertheless, the relevance of key IR 
theories, such as realism, liberalism, rationalism, and con-
structivism, in the study of the UNGA voting records cannot 
be ignored (Brian & Damiel, 2002).
The realist worldview considers sovereign states are the 
main policy actors in an ‘anarchic’ international system. The 
realists are skeptical about the possibility of international 
cooperation and sees survival as the fundamental motive of a 
state in an anarchic international system (Andreatta, 2005; 
Mearsheimer, 1994). States are likely to ‘bandwagon’ or 
form alliances with powerful actors to survive in a system 
lacking a hierarchical political order. Thus, according to the 
realists, identically cast votes in the UNGA resolutions 
would be indicative of similar preferences within the limits 
of protecting the sovereignty norms. Such similar prefer-
ences, according to the realist school of thought, are likely to 
crumble in times of crisis where states are pushed for “self-
help” to survive. Similarly, concerns for relative gains are 
likely to limit cooperating between the states or blocks of 
states and affect their voting preferences.
The liberalists disagree with the realist assumption, that 
power is the means by which security is guaranteed, suggest-
ing cooperation as the most pervasive element in international 
relations (Cranmer, 2005; Walt, 1998). Liberalists’ emphasis 
on formal or informal institutions to promote cooperation 
between states justifies the relevance of the UNGA as a plat-
form for policy diffusion and its voting records as an indicator 
for the prospect of cooperation or conflict. However, the 
incentive to cooperate in multilateral forum, according to the 
liberalists’ view, is constrained by national politics, interest 
groups and public opinion, particularly in democratic 
countries.
The rationalists view (Fearon & Wendt, 2002) the states 
as unitary actors which calculate the marginal utility of their 
actions. Rationalists believe that the state’s behavior is 
inspired by the logic of consequentiality (March & Olsen, 
1989). Thus, for a rationalist, the UNGA voting preferences 
of a member state is a “goal-seeking behaviour” explaining 
the member state’s foreign policy.
The constructivist’s emphasis on the intersubjective struc-
ture of the state system, which helps to formulate state identi-
ties and interests (Wendt, 1994, p. 385), distinguishes it from 
the other approaches. Constructivists’ emphasis on “shared 
ideas” that shape behavior by constituting the identities and 
interests of actors (Copeland, 2006) suggests that the voting 
preferences of the member states in the UNGA are driven by 
the logic of appropriateness. State voting preferences are 
based on their assessment of what they consider proper 
within the context of the group they belong (or want to 
belong) at a particular time and on a particular agenda. 
According to the constructivist view, the voting blocks that 
form within the UNGA during any roll-call session is the 
result of informal, “societal” development, creating a web of 
consultation with integrative effects leading to the voting 
preferences of individual countries (Birnberg, 2009; Glarbo, 
2001).
The conceptual and theoretical framework to explain the 
UNGA voting preferences of the developing states is much 
scantier. In multilateral forums, the developing states are 
generally considered to be engaged in “low politics” (pro-
moting external economic relations, incentives and access) 
as opposed to “high politics” (i.e., traditional politico-diplo-
matic activities, alliance building, considered essential for 
the survival of the nation-state). The goals for these states, 
dubbed as “the third party,” are to get more favorable terms 
of trade with developed countries, to receive more aid, to 
regulate investments of transnational companies, to resched-
ule debt, or debt relief leveraging the multilateral forum 
(Iida, 1988; Voeten, 2013). Thus, their voting preference is 
mostly used as an independent variable to identify “voting 
blocks” and alignment with established regional and global 
powers.
In the context of developing states, the capacity of the 
state, regime type, and pressure from the donors, regional 
and global powers are cited as the most common causes for 
the propensity to and frequency of changes in voting prefer-
ences at the UNGA (Brazys & Panke, 2017; Dreher & Jensen, 
2013; Dreher & Sturm, 2012). It is argued that the higher a 
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state’s level of capacity, the less likely it will be to change its 
UNGA vote. Similarly, an autocratic state is more likely to 
shift its voting preference, while states with higher levels of 
aid dependency will have an increased likelihood of vote 
shifts. As a result, it is implied that for divisive resolutions, 
the developing states are often unable or unwilling to main-
tain a principled position. The UNGA voting records may 
also serve as a tool to demonstrate ideological unity and 
legitimation of policy to appeal regime loyalty and national 
cohesion. With these insights about the conceptual and theo-
retical underpinnings, we now examine the nature of the 
UNGA votes.
The Nature of the UNGA Voting 
Record
The sheer range of issues discussed at the UNGA in each 
year by the member states makes it a key platform for policy 
innovation, diffusion, and endorsement of global issues, 
albeit in a non-binding way. Although most resolutions are 
adopted without a vote, each year around 65 to 95 resolutions 
are adopted in the plenary sessions by recorded/roll-call 
votes. According to the Rule 66 of the Plenary Meetings 
Rules of Procedure, XII, at least one third of the members are 
needed to be present at these sessions for the voting to hap-
pen. Between 2001 and 2017, total of 1,284 resolutions were 
put to vote in 1,873 plenary meetings (Figure 1). The voting 
records broadly reflect where a country stands, with whom it 
stands and for what purpose—at least in the UN context.
It is rare to know or directly observe the dynamics that 
shape the states’ voting preferences. Thus, the UNGA voting 
data are regarded as an indirect but close proxy of such 
dynamics to explore political proximity and policy inclina-
tion of a state (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Dixon, 1981; Gartzke, 
1998; Signorino & Ritter, 1999). As mentioned before, votes 
by a developing country may be influenced by her strategic 
motives, regional/global influence, material incentives, or 
leadership change. However, the non-binding nature of the 
UNGA resolutions also implies that “strategic” calculations 
are a less common phenomenon.
Second, in contrast to the UNSC, the UNGA is a univer-
sally represented body and its voting records offer a compa-
rable longitudinal data set of all member states. The UNSC 
has only five permanent (China, France, Russia, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom) and 10 rotating members, 
hence no scope for a longitudinal data set on all countries. 
Some UNGA decisions on “important questions,” such as the 
maintenance of international peace and security, are made by 
a two-third majority of the members present and voting (Rule 
86, Plenary Meetings, Rules of procedure). Some of these 
resolutions are also regarded as “critical” by a regional/




























Figure 1. Plenary meetings and resolutions adopted by recorded/roll-call vote at the UNGA, 2001–2017.
Source. Author’s compilation from United Nations Department of Public Information (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).
Note. UNGA = United Nations General Assembly.
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positive outcome at the plenary voting (Pauls & Cranmer, 
2017; Schaefer & Kim, 2018, p. 432; Wang, 1999, p. 200).
Third, the voting data reflects the outcome of an obscured 
underlying process, arrived at by the officials of each coun-
try through an institutionalized mechanism for communi-
cation. These officials, representing their government’s 
position and operating through a repeated and regular inter-
actions at the UNGA, share common values and goals such 
as global communication, cooperation, and negotiated set-
tlements to isolationism and conflict. The unique character-
istics of the actors and their network of knowledge make 
them an epistemic community—defined as “cross-national 
collective[s] of individuals with common interests and insti-
tutionalised mechanisms for communication” (Haas, 2018, 
p. 788). Such community has an authoritative claim to pol-
icy-relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise and 
plays an important role in the diffusion of information, 
influencing the decision-making process. Thus, the voting 
data—that is, the output of this epistemic community—are a 
valid proxy of the obscured underlying process at a set point 
of time (Bailey et al., 2017, p. 431; Lazer, 2005, p. 56; 
Newcombe, 1976).
Researchers have used the UNGA voting data to investi-
gate systemic polarity in the international system (De 
Mesquita, 1975; Voeten, 2004), foreign aid effectiveness 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2008), alliance build-
ing, probability of conflicts (Gartzke, 2000; Pevehouse, 
2004), “third world” solidarity (Iida, 1988), and so on. The 
U.S. Department of State (2000, 2008) submits yearly report 
to the Congress analyzing the UNGA voting practices of the 
UN member states. The report evaluates the actions and 
responsiveness of those members states to U.S. policy on 
“issues of special importance” to the United States. The 
reports are sent to each U.S. diplomatic mission abroad with 
instruction to deliver a copy to the respective government. 
The UNGA voting data are also used to capture the position 
of member states vis-à-vis the “US-led liberal order” or “US 
dominance” in the UN to identify the member state’s policy 
shifts (Bailey et al., 2017; Voeten, 2004). Countries’ voting 
behavior is also used to test the “political proximity” hypoth-
esis and linked to the lending decisions by the International 
Financial Institutions (Barro & Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2009; 
Dreher & Sturm, 2012, p. 233; Stone, 2004; Thacker, 1999).
However, as hinted before, the UNGA data are not the 
most comprehensive tool to explain the full dynamics of 
states’ policy preferences. The political dynamics of the 
bilateral relationships, geopolitical factors, trade and eco-
nomic interdependence, security need, and regime type are 
also important to assess the political proximity of a member 
state and the matrix of conflict and cooperation (Lai & Reiter, 
2000, pp. 203–227; Pevehouse, 2004). Indeed, the Gulf state 
of Bahrain that has consistently maintained a low voting 
coincidence with the United States at the UNGA (merely 
25%–33% in 2001–2017) also houses the U.S. Navy’s Fifth 
Fleet—driven by its security needs (Jones, 2011). Similarly, 
Bangladesh’s low voting coincidence with the United States 
at the UNGA has not dwindled the U.S. military and eco-
nomic aid and assistance to the country (U.S. Agency for 
International Development, 2018). The bilateral factors, con-
text, and the contents of the resolution together with the 
importance attached to the agenda by the member state at a 
time and space remains important to meaningfully interpret 
the UNGA voting data.
Why to Compare Bangladesh’s Voting 
Data With the Key Players?
Several factors make Bangladesh a good case to study. First, 
Bangladesh is situated in the periphery of international poli-
tics like many other small developing states. The country 
houses 8.4% of the total world Muslim population and 88.2% 
of Bangladeshis are Muslims (Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics, 2016). Thus, Bangladesh came into the interna-
tional spotlight following the declaration of the U.S.-led 
“war on terrorism” in 2001 for the fear that the influence by 
Islamist extremists could destabilize the country (U.S. 
Department of State, 2002; Vaughn, 2013). Some were 
tempted to brand Bangladesh as a “hotbed of terrorism,” 
potential “breeding ground of Islamist extremism,” and the 
“next Afghanistan” soon to become a “failed state” (Griswold, 
2005; Karlekar, 2005; Perry, 2002). However, defying such 
speculations, Bangladesh upheld its reputation as a moderate 
and democratic Muslim majority country by pursuing a 
holistic multi-stakeholder approach to fight terrorism. It has 
also fostered a moderate and harmonious religious culture 
compared with its relatively more extreme neighbors (Bashar, 
2017; Kamal, 2013; Vaughn, 2013). Thus, Bangladesh’s vot-
ing preferences at the UNGA at a period when it was under 
international spotlight could be useful to analyze her policy 
preferences on regional and global issues.
Second, the country is exposed to the influence of 
two key regional players—India and China, both vying to 
keep Bangladesh under their sphere of influence (Bhardwaj, 
2003; Datta, 2008; Kanwal, 2018; Riaz, 2019, pp. 53–76). 
Nevertheless, it is widely believed that “Dhaka remains 
aware that both Delhi and Beijing take more than they give 
to Bangladesh” (Cookson & Joehnk, 2018). Thus, exploring 
the trend of Bangladesh voting coincidences with India and 
China and examining specific issues where Bangladesh 
voted against these two regional players, can provide useful 
insights into her foreign policy inclinations in a multilateral 
forum.
Third, the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 is the only example 
of forcibly creating a new state propelled by ethnic-linguistic 
movement in the Cold War era, amid a juxtaposed position of 
the United States and the former Soviet Union (Baxter, 1997; 
Blair, 2001, pp. 45–148). Two successive Soviet veto at the 
UNSC facilitated Bangladesh’s birth as an independent state. 
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However, Bangladesh’s dependency and support from Russia 
have reduced over the years, particularly after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Bangladesh’s practice of multiparty 
democracy, in principle, also puts her in the block of coun-
tries promoting “the U.S. led liberal world order.” Amid such 
contrast and a resurgent Russia, it would be interesting to 
examine Bangladesh’s voting preferences at the UNGA to 
observe where the country stands, with whom and for what 
purposes in the multilateral platform.
Finally, a case study on Bangladesh’s policy inclination on 
global issues based on her UNGA voting records is long over-
due. Most analyses on Bangladesh’s foreign policy inclina-
tion—particularly with respect to India and China—are 
descriptive, impressionistic, and unsystematic. These studies 
are focused on normative issues like history and culture, 
geography, leadership affiliations and bilateral visits, the reli-
gious factor, security posture, military hardware acquisition 
preferences, and so on (Bhardwaj, 2003; Datta, 2008; Kumar, 
2017; Pattanaik, 2005; Zaman, 2017). As a result, an evi-
dence-based analysis of where and with whom Bangladesh’s 
epistemic community stands in a multilateral forum on key 
global issues has largely remained unexplored.
Data and Method
The voting data extracted, are from the “The Index to 
Proceedings of the General Assembly,” published each year 
by United Nations Department of Public Information (UN 
DPI) and is available online in the UN Dag Hammarskjold 
Library. The index includes a voting chart that provides the 
list of resolutions adopted by recorded or roll-call vote. The 
vote by each member state is recorded in the textual form 
such as Y (for “yes”), N (for “no”), A (for abstention), and 
“blank” indicating absence. Bangladesh’s voting data from 
1975 is available. However, this article examines data from 
the 56th session through the 72nd session (2001–2017). The 
selected period is large enough to include preferences on 
wide-ranging resolutions made by two major political par-
ties in Bangladesh—namely the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party and the Awami League, who were in power during this 
period.
Most analyses of UNGA voting records use dyadic data 
set. The U.S.-centric dyadic data set is the most common one 
(Voeten, 2013), while China and India–centric data set and 
analysis are also emerging (Das, 2017; Fu, 2013). This arti-
cle is based on a novel Bangladesh-centric dyadic data set 
prepared by coding and comparing Bangladesh’s voting 
preference in each UNGA resolutions with the preferences of 
China, India, Russia, and the United States. However, an 
inherent limitation of dyadic data set is that it can only reveal 
shifts in preference similarity between two states, but not 
which state has shifted.
There are several methods to code the voting data to 
calculate voting coincidence. For example, Gartzke and 
Dong-Joon (2002) code voting coincidence between −1 
and 1, with abstentions being in between compliance and 
non-compliance. Russett (1967) and Rai (1972) code each 
country’s vote as 2 (for yes votes), 1 (for abstain or absent), 
and 0 (for no vote). However, the most common approach 
is to categorize the dyadic data set as “same,” “opposite,” 
“partial,” and “absent” (Thacker, 1999; U.S. Department of 
State, 2008). The “same” is the total number of times both 
the countries voted as yes/yes, no/no or abstain/abstain for a 
resolution. The “opposite” is the situation when the countries 
voted counter to each other (i.e., one country voted “yes,” 
but the other country voted “no” and vice versa). The 
“partial” is the number of times when their voting prefer-
ences were partially aligned (one country, but not both, 
abstained). The “absent” is the number of times the listed 
country did not vote.
Subsequently, the voting coincidence is calculated by 
adding one (1) point for every “same” vote, zero (0) point for 
every “opposite” vote, and a half (0.5) point for every 
“partial” vote. The point assigned is rational—in particular, 
the weight of abstention votes affects the “partial” category 
making it distinctly different from the other two. It also 
conforms to the predominant view in the literature that a 
“no” vote is a stronger signal of disapproval than an absten-
tion. A member state may be seduced/coerced not only to 
comply (i.e., vote Y/N) but also to avoid non-compliance 
(i.e., abstain). The total number of points is then divided by 
the total number of votes each year excluding absences 
and expressed in percentage. The “absences” is excluded, as 
the reasons for a country’s absence can be purposeful or situ-
ational (unable to attend)—which is hard to determine 
(Kegley & Hook, 1991; Palmer et al., 2002; Voeten, 2013; 
Zimmermann, 1993). For example, during “government turn-
overs” member states may temporarily have no UN delega-
tion to vote at the UNGA (Voeten, 2013, p. 5).
Bangladesh’s voting coincidence with China, India, 
Russia, and the United States, as calculated by this method-
ology, forms the broad basis to compare the country’s policy 
inclination. Subsequently, Bangladesh’s “opposite” votes, 
voting preferences in different thematic categories with a 
focus on the country-specific resolutions on HR situation 
and the content of such resolutions, are examined for a more 
nuanced analysis of the country’s policy position and politi-
cal proximity with the key players on global issues.
Bangladesh’s Voting Records at the 
UNGA
Bangladesh’s Constitution (1972; Art 25) states, ‘‘the State 
shall base its international relations on the principles of 
respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settle-
ment of international disputes, and respect for international 
law and the principles enunciated in the United Nations 
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Charter . . .’’. Thus, it is expected that the country’s voting 
preferences will be largely aligned with the norms developed 
in the UNGA. Figure 2 provides a summary of the voting 
records of Bangladesh, China, India, Russia, and the United 
States on the 1,284 UNGA resolutions between 2001 and 
2017. Bangladesh voted “yes” in 91% resolutions followed 
by China (83%), India (79%), and Russia (69%). Bangladesh 
disagreed with 35 resolutions (3%), “abstained” in 66 resolu-
tions (5%), and was absent during the voting of 14 resolu-
tions. Bangladesh’s voting trend as a strong supporter of 
UNGA resolutions is trailed by China, India and Russia.
During this period, the United States disagreed with 68% 
of the resolutions. An analysis of the reasons for discordant 
votes by the United States is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, the IR scholars have attributed it to the “schisms” 
between the United States as the remaining superpower 
and the rest of the world, suggesting that such schisms 
“constitutes a prelude to the formation of balancing coali-
tions that could eventually undermine American hegemony” 
(Huntington, 1999, pp. 35–49; Nye, 2002; Voeten, 2004, 
p. 747). With these broad insights, we return to investigate 
the voting coincidence of Bangladesh with respect to India, 
China, Russia, and the United States to draw inferences 
about Bangladesh’s political proximity and foreign policy 
preferences.
Voting Coincidences
In terms of dyadic similarity/opposition, Bangladesh’s vot-
ing coincidence (Figure 3) shows that the country’s prefer-
ence on global issues has been more aligned with China, 
India and Russia compared with the United States. Voting 
coincidence with the United States remained between 14% 
and 30%, gradually increasing since 2007 (with the excep-
tion in 2013–2014). However, Bangladesh’s vote on terror-
ism-related resolutions has been mostly aligned with the 
United States. In the case of Russia, the voting coincidence 
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Voted 'Yes' Voted 'No' Abstained Absent
Figure 2. Summary of voting records of Bangladesh, China, India, Russia, and the United States at UNGA, 2001–2017.
Source. Author’s compilation from United Nations Department of Public Information (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).
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Figure 3. Bangladesh’s voting coincidences with China, India, Russia, and the United States at the UNGA, 2001–2017.
Source. Author’s compilation from United Nations Department of Public Information (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).
Note. UNGA = United Nations General Assembly.
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since 2011–2012. Such a trend was maintained by all the 
governments in power between 2001 and 2017 in Bangladesh.
In the regional context, Bangladesh’s voting coincidence 





















   'Coincidence'_China  'Coincidence'_India
Figure 4. Bangladesh’s voting coincidences with China and India at the UNGA, 2001–2018.
Source. Author’s compilation from United Nations Department of Public Information (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).
Note. UNGA = United Nations General Assembly.
Figure 5. Distribution of “opposite” votes by Bangladesh at the UNGA, 2001–2017.
Source. Author’s compilation.
Note. UNGA = United Nations General Assembly.
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comparative gap in Bangladesh’s voting coincidences with 
China and India is meager and has consistently remained in 
favor of China until 2011. However, the country’s voting 
coincidences with India surpassed that of China in 2013 and 
has gradually increased since then with the exception in 2014 
(see Figure 4). Does this increased voting coincidence with 
India reflect a shift of Bangladesh’s policy preferences?
As alluded before, a high voting coincidence alone may 
be meaningless as many UNGA resolutions are procedural in 
nature and not particularly “important” to a state’s national 
interest. Key regional/global players may not expend any 
political capital to influence the voting preferences of uncon-
troversial/procedural resolutions. One useful way to tease 
out the nuances of the increased/decreased voting coinci-
dence and policy shifts is to examine the “opposite” votes 
by Bangladesh and the thematic issues of such resolutions, 
discussed next.
“Opposite” Votes
Exploring the ‘opposite’ votes allows examining the implicit 
assumption of ‘path dependency’ in developing states’ voting 
at the UNGA. Figure 5 depicts the yearly distribution of the 
“opposite” votes by Bangladesh at the UNGA for the period 
of 2001–2017. Bangladesh voted “opposite” to the United 
States 888 times followed by 89 times to Russia during this 
period. In the regional context, Bangladesh voted opposite to 
India 48 times while the same for China was only 16 times 
with three overlaps. Three overlapping resolutions are (a) 
declaration on human cloning, (b) taking forward multilat-
eral nuclear disarmament negotiations, and (c) toward a 
nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation 
of nuclear disarmament commitments (UNGA, 2005, 2017a, 
2017b). Such preference broadly suggests that Bangladesh’s 
policy inclination on global issues is significantly closer to 
China.
To further explore this trend in the regional context, we 
examine Bangladesh’s voting preference in occasions where 
India and China voted opposite to each other. Bangladesh’s 
voting preference in such occasions could be deemed 
“important” and better reflect the country’s alignment. In 33 
such occasions, Bangladesh’s voting preferences were 
aligned with China in 29 times and only 4 times with India 
(Figure 6). More importantly, Bangladesh’s voting prefer-
ence was not aligned with either India or China in the 
remaining 28 occasions during this period.
The analysis of the “opposite” vote hints at three possible 
inferences. First, despite Bangladesh’s increased voting 
coincidence with India since 2013, the country’s position on 
global issues has remained significantly aligned with China. 
Second, the aggregate increase/decrease in voting coinci-
dence may be due to the nature of issues raised in the UNGA 
for voting in these sessions and not entirely a reflection of 
policy inclination. Third, the voting coincidence does not 
suggest the directionality—that is, whether Bangladesh’s 
policy preference is shifting toward China/India or the other 
way around. Indeed, Bangladesh maintains a principled 
position on some global issues that are not aligned to either 
India or China, suggesting an independent policy preference 
irrespective of the influence from the key regional players.
Thematic Issues of the Resolutions
Examining the thematic issues of the resolutions in which 
Bangladesh voted “opposite” (see Annex A for the list) to 
India and China provides a more nuanced insight into the 
nature of Bangladesh’s alignment and difference with the 
key regional players. The resolutions can be placed into three 
broad categories: (a) disarmament of conventional weapons, 
(b) nuclear disarmament and prohibition of chemical weap-
ons, and (c) HR and the rights for self-determination. The 
“other” category includes three resolutions: (a) regional con-
fidence building (UNGA, 2003), (b) human cloning (UNGA, 
2005), and (c) entrepreneurship for development (UNGA, 
2015). As evident from Figure 7, Bangladesh’s consistent 
support for the resolutions on conventional arms control at 
the regional and sub-regional levels stands at odds with 




Aligned with India Aligned with China Not Aligned with India and China
Figure 6. Alignment of Bangladesh’s “Opposite” votes with India and China at the UNGA, 2001–2017.
Note. UNGA = United Nations General Assembly.
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of conventional arms control in promoting regional and 
international peace, calling for urgent consideration to the 
issues to promote agreements to strengthen regional peace 
and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and 
military forces, and to prevent the possibility of military 
attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression. The 
resolutions on conventional arms control also recognize that 
“states with larger military capabilities have a special respon-
sibility in promoting such agreements for regional security.” 
However, India remains the only country that has opposed all 
such resolutions during this period.
As opposed to India, Bangladesh has consistently voted 
for a nuclear-weapon-free world and disarmament (24 “oppo-
site” votes). These resolutions call for “achieving the univer-
sality of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), devising 
‘effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives’,” 
design disarmament and non-proliferation education and 
training program to promote a culture of non-violence and 
peace. As a non-signatory of the NPT, India’s position on 
these resolutions is fathomable. Interestingly, until 2016, 
China consistently voted “opposite” to India or abstained on 
a resolution calling for a “nuclear-weapon-free world and 
accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament 
commitments.” Except for three abstentions, China consis-
tently voted “yes” to this resolution between 2001 and 2017. 
India also consistently opposed a similar resolution titled 
“Toward a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new 
agenda,” while China has either abstained or voted “yes.” 
China also opposes the prohibition of the development, pro-
duction, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on 
their destruction.
The analysis of the “opposite” votes on these thematic 
categories suggests that Bangladesh maintains a principled 
position on the issue of conventional arms control, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and prohibition of chemical weapons. It 
affirms that the epistemic community of Bangladesh dealing 
with country’s policy preferences at the UNGA is broadly 
aligned with the global community promoting disarmament, 
non-proliferation and regional peace. It also reaffirms the 
findings that the variations in Bangladesh’s voting coinci-


























Figure 7. Thematic issues of “opposite” votes by Bangladesh at the UNGA, 2001–2017.
Source. Author’s compilation.








  'No' Votes   'Yes' Votes (Israel-Palestine Issue)
Figure 8. Bangladesh’s voting record on country/territory-specific HR resolutions at the UNGA, 2001–2018.
Source. Author’s calculations.
Note. HR = human rights; UNGA = United Nations General Assembly.
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resolutions that are put to vote at the UNGA sessions and 
may not reflect a fundamental policy shift. However, 
Bangladesh’s voting preferences with respect to the resolu-
tions on HR shows greater inconsistency—discussed next.
Voting Record on HR-Related Resolutions
Considering the wide range of HR related resolutions, this 
article focuses on the voting records of country-specific 
HR situation. The HR resolutions cover issues like terrorism, 
torture, extrajudicial killing, use of mercenaries, unilateral 
coercive measures, distribution of membership in the HR 
treaty bodies, and review of HR conference/reports. These 
resolutions generally condemn the HR violations of a 
member state; as a result, they draw political reactions and 
variations in voting preferences by the member states 
(Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013, p. 358; Office of the High 
Commissioner, United Nations Human Rights, 2017; UNGA, 
2020). While voting in such resolutions, member states are 
often challenged to choose between the concept of “non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries” and 
supporting the oppressed peoples engaged in a “just struggle 
Figure 9. Bangladesh’s voting coincidences with China, India, Russia and the United States at the UNGA on country-specific resolutions 
on HR situation between 2001 and 2018.
Source. Author’s compilation.
Note. UNGA = United Nations General Assembly; HR = human rights.
Figure 10. “Opposite” votes by Bangladesh at the UNGA on country-specific resolutions on HR situation between 2001 and 2018.
Source. Author’s compilation.
Note. UNGA = United Nations General Assembly; HR = human rights.
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against imperialism, colonialism or racialism.” Although the 
resolutions on HR violation in Palestinian has consistently 
received broad support at the UNGA, the variations in voting 
preferences on other country-specific HR resolutions are 
wide. Examining these variations can provide useful insight 
into the country’s political proximity and foreign policy 
consistency.
Between 2001 and 2017 a total of 90 country-specific HR 
resolutions were put to vote at the UNGA (details in Annex 
B). Bangladesh voted against 27 such resolutions, abstained 
in 24 and agreed with 38 (Figure 8). Majority of the agreed 
(87%) resolutions relates to the Palestine issue, condemning 
the Israeli actions in the occupied territories. Bangladesh’s 
support for the Palestinian people is aligned with her consti-
tutional provision (Art. 25b and c) of supporting oppressed 
peoples throughout the world. However, Bangladesh, like 
many others, has also voted against or abstained from voting 
in many country-specific HR resolutions. Majority of these 
resolutions relate to condemning the HR situation in Iran, 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Syria, 
Myanmar and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Consequently, Bangladesh’s voting coincidences on this 
issue vary widely as depicted in Figures 9 and 10. Overall, 
Bangladesh’s voting preference on these resolutions has 
been more aligned with India. With China, Bangladesh is 
mostly at odds with respect to her votes on the HR situation 
in the DPRK and Syria. Such variations tend to suggest 
Bangladesh’s selective adherence to the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Bangladesh’s voting preferences on HR situation in 
Myanmar is worth examining. Between 2001 and 2017, the 
resolution on the HR situation in Myanmar was put to vote 
on seven occasions (see Table 1).Until 2017, Bangladesh 
voted against the resolutions, aligned with Russia and China, 
and not with the majority in the Assembly. The pre-2017 
resolutions on Myanmar consistently expressed concern 
about the “discrimination, HR violations, violence, 
displacement and economic deprivation affecting . . . the 
Rohingya ethnic minority” and called upon the government 
of Myanmar to grant citizenship to the Rohingyas (UNGA, 
2010, p. 3; UNGA, 2012, p. 4; UNGA, 2007, 2008b, 2009b, 
2011a). Despite receiving widespread condemnations, China 
has consistently voted against all such resolutions; India 
agreed to condemn Myanmar’s poor HR situation only in 
2011; however, after the vote, the Indian delegation advised 
the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against (UNGA, 
2011b, p. 2). India also abstained from voting Myanmar’s 
HR situation in 2017. Bangladesh started condemning the 
poor HR condition in Myanmar only since 2017. The change 
in Bangladesh’s voting preference raises the question as to 
why Bangladesh was shy to join the majority of the Assembly 
members to condemn Myanmar’s HR violation in support of 
the rights of the Rohingya?
A comparison of the preambulatory and operative clauses 
of pre- and post-2017 resolutions on Myanmar’s HR situa-
tions provides a plausible explanation. Preambulatory 
clauses are historic justifications for action and operative 
clauses are policies that the resolution is designed to create. 
The preambulatory and operative clauses of pre-2017 resolu-
tions do not mention Bangladesh. However, after 2017, reso-
lution in which Bangladesh, joined the majority of the UN 
members to condemn Myanmar’s HR violation, mentions 
that the Assembly is “highly alarmed at the outbreak of 
violence in Rakhine State . . . that has caused hundreds of 
thousands of Rohingya civilians to flee towards Bangladesh” 
(UNGA, 2018a, pp. 4–5, italic added). Subsequently, the 
resolution expresses “deep concern at the plight of refugees 
and forcibly displaced persons living in Bangladesh” calling 
the international community to assist Bangladesh in provid-
ing humanitarian assistance (UNGA, 2018a, pp. 1–5, italic 
added). Thus, it would appear that Bangladesh joined the 
majority of the member states condemning its neighbor only 
when the resolutions started mentioning Bangladesh as an 
“effected State party.” Indeed, during the 65th plenary 
Table 1. Voting Records of Bangladesh, India, China, Russia, and the United States on Resolutions Relating to the HR Situation in 
Myanmar, 2001–2019.
Session Reference Total, votes (Y-N-A) Bangladesh China India United States Russia
2006–2007 A/RES/61/232 82-25-45 N N N Y N
2007–2008 A/RES/62/222 83-22-47 N N N Y N
2008–2009 A/RES/63/245 80-25-45 N N N Y N
2009–2010 A/RES/64/238 86-23-39 N N N Y N
2010–2011 A/RES/65/241 85-26-46 N N N Y N
2011–2012 A/RES/66/230 83-21-39 N N Ya Y N
2017–2018 A/RES/72/248 122-10-24 Y N A Y N
2018–2019 A/RES/73/264 136-8-22 Y N A Y N
2019–2020 A/RES/74/246 134-9-28 Y N A Y N
Source. Author’s compilation.
Note. HR = human rights; UNGA = United Nations General Assembly.
Bold indicates change in voting preference.
aSubsequently, the Indian delegation advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against (United Nations General Assembly, 2011b, p. 2).
12 SAGE Open
meeting, Bangladesh’s representative stated “a number of 
provisions of the draft resolution relates Bangladesh as an 
‘effected State party’ reaffirming Bangladesh’s support for 
the draft as well as to comply with the provisions relevant to 
Bangladesh” (UNGA, 2018b, p. 11). It suggests that, in the 
context of its neighbors, Bangladesh tends to attach more 
importance to the principle of “non-interference” over the 
principle of “supporting the oppressed peoples.” Whether the 
adherence to such a policy in this context was prudent and 
served the country’s best interest remains contested.
The logic of “non-interference” appears to break down 
when comparing Bangladesh’s voting records with respect 
to the HR situations in DPRK and Syria (see Annex B). 
Breaking its practice of abstention, Bangladesh joined 101 
and 94 other states, in 2007 and in 2008 respectively, to 
express “very serious concern at the persistence of continu-
ing reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights” in the 
DPRK (UNGA, 2009a, p. 3; UNGA, 2008a). Similarly, in 
2012, Bangladesh joined 135 other states to strongly con-
demn the continued widespread and systematic gross viola-
tions of HR and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian 
authorities (UNGA, 2013, p. 3). Thus, Bangladesh’s adher-
ence to the principle of non-inference appears to be selective 
albeit more stringent in the context of neighbors. Such a 
practice can also be interpreted as cautions but imprudent—
particularly in case of Myanmar since the country faced two 
major waves of Rohingya refugees and yet was late to join 
the global community to condemn Myanmar’s HR violation 
that led to the third wave of Rohingya refugees in 2019.
In sum, several conclusions can be drawn from the above 
analysis. First, although Bangladesh’s year-on-year voting 
coincidence shifted from China toward India since 2013, 
country’s disagreements (“opposite” votes) with India have 
remained 3 times higher compared with that of China, sug-
gesting that the post-2013 change in voting coincidence is 
more about the types of resolutions that were put to vote and 
not a fundamental shift in its policy position on global issues. 
Bangladesh’s policy preference on global issues during this 
period has been mostly aligned with China followed by India 
and Russia. Second, Bangladesh maintained a principled 
position on the issues of conventional arms control, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and prohibition of chemical weapons. 
Country’s voting preferences on these issues have constantly 
remained at odds with the two key regional powers. Third, 
Bangladesh’s voting preferences with respect to the country-
specific resolutions on HR reflects a selective adherence to 
the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries, particularly with respect to a neighbor. Overall, 
Bangladesh’s voting preferences at the UNGA tends to sug-
gest that the country has maintained a principled position on 
certain global issues while remaining selective on HR-related 
resolutions amid the regional and extra-regional influences 
and security and humanitarian considerations.
Concluding Remarks
The UNGA voting record is the product of an epistemic 
community. Despite being non-binding, these voting records 
have long been used to explore member states’ policy pref-
erences and understanding their political proximities on 
global issues. However, there has been very little research 
on the voting preferences of small developing countries. 
This article is expected to have filled that void by offering 
an evidence-based analysis of Bangladesh’s foreign policy 
inclinations in a multilateral forum, especially during the 
period 2001–2017.
It is believed that by taking Bangladesh’s voting patterns 
in UNGA as a case example, this study may have also 
revealed the usefulness and limitations of using the UNGA 
vote records as a tool to assess ideological preferences, 
policy choices and strategic alliances of small developing 
countries, especially on global issues.
The consistency in Bangladesh’s voting choices on issues 
related to the international peace, such as disarmament 
and nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, tend 
to reflect the constructivist’s emphasis on shared ideas, 
achieved and maintained through a degree of socialization 
with the global community. On these normative questions, 
Bangladesh’s epistemic community was guided by the logic 
of appropriateness and could not be swayed by a regional or 
global power. Such a principled position maintained by 
Bangladesh with regard to these (non-binding) resolutions 
tend to defy the conventional wisdom, that the developing 
states cannot maintain a principled position and are subject 
to “vote-buying” in the UNGA. Bangladesh’s voting coher-
ency also suggests that the small developing countries with 
a democratic system can maintain a higher levels of voting 
consistency on issues that are of great interest to them.
However, Bangladesh’s inconstancy in the voting prefer-
ence with regard to the HR resolutions further nourishes the 
theoretical debate on using the UNGA voting records as 
the microcosm of world politics. Indeed, the selective adher-
ence to the principle of non-interference—in particular, 
Bangladesh’s vote shifting with respect to Myanmar since 
2017—would support a realist worldview. Facing a large 
influx of Rohingya refugees that posed a security risk, the 
country chose the path of “self-help” and decided to con-
demn Myanmar, abandoning her previous position that was 
mostly aligned with the regional powers. However, the vot-
ing inconstancy on the resolutions regarding the HR situa-
tion in DPRK and Syria tends to suggest that the country is 
yet to formulate principled foreign policy positions on HR 
resolutions. Although assessment of voting coincidence 
alone may not capture the whole dynamics of the bilateral/
international leanings of a state, this article has revealed that 
systematic research of UNGA voting records has the capac-
ity to add to the knowledge of foreign policy dynamics of a 
developing state in terms of the way they weigh their choices 
and chart their path through idealism and opportunism.
Khan 13
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Prof. M Adil Khan, University of Queensland, 
Australia, and former senior policy manager of the United Nations 
and Prof. Ali Riaz, distinguished professor at the Department of 
Politics and Government, Illinois State University, for their valu-
able comments on the initial draft.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect 
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan  https://orcid.org/0000-0002 
-7917-7313
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
References
Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom 
and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), 33–63. www.
jstor.org/stable/40216022
Andreatta, F. (2005). Theory and the European Union’s interna-
tional relations. In C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.), International 
relations and the European Union (pp. 18–38). Oxford 
University Press.
Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating 
dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022002715595700
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. (2016). Report on Bangladesh 
sample vital statistics—2015.
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J.-W. (2005). IMF-programs: Who is chosen 
and what are the effects? Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 
1245–1269. https://doi.org/10.3386/w8951.
Bashar, I. (2017). Countering violent extremism in Bangladesh. 
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 9(6), 17–21. www.
jstor.org/stable/26351528
Baxter, C. (1997). Bangladesh: From a nation to a state (1st ed.). 
Westview Press.
Bhardwaj, S. (2003). Bangladesh foreign policy vis-a-vis India. 
Strategic Analysis, 27(2), 263–278. https://doi.org/10.1080 
/09700160308450087
Birnberg, G. (2009). The voting behaviour of the European Union 
member states in the United Nations General Assembly 
[Master’s thesis]. Department of Government of the London 
School of Economics. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4002 
0834.pdf
Blair, H. W. (2001). Civil society, democratic development and 
international donors. In R. Jahan (Ed.), Bangladesh: Promise 
and performance (pp. 181–217). Zed Books.
Brazys, S., & Panke, D. (2017). Why do states change positions 
in the United Nations General Assembly? International 
Political Science Review, 38(1), 70–84. https://doi.org/10.1177 
/0192512115616540
Brian, L., & Daniel, M. (2002, August). Liberalism, Realism, and 
United Nations Voting: An Empirical Test of Contending 
Theories. Annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. http://works.bepress.com/brian_lai/22/
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. (1972, 
November 4). Bangladesh. https://www.refworld.org/docid 
/3ae6b5684.html
Cookson, F., & Joehnk, T. F. (2018, 11 April). China and India’s 
geopolitical tug of war for Bangladesh. East Asian Forum. 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/
Copeland, D. C. (2006). The constructivist challenge to structural 
realism. In S. Guzzini & A. Leander (Eds.), Constructivism and 
international relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics (pp. 
1–20). Routledge.
Cranmer, S. J. (2005). Realism and liberalism third pass. University 
of North Carolina.
Das, A. (2017). A fine balance: India’s voting record at the UNGA 
(Issue No. 192). Observer Research Foundation. https://www.
orfonline.org/research/fine-balance-india-voting-record-unga/
Datta, S. (2008). Bangladesh’s relations with China and India: A 
comparative study. Strategic Analysis, 32(5), 755–772. https://
doi.org/10.1080/09700160802309134
De Mesquita, B. (1975). Measuring systemic polarity. The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 19(2), 187–216. www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/173415
Dixon, W. J. (1981). The emerging image of U.N. politics. World 
Politics, 34(1), 47–61. http://doi.org/10.2307/2010150
Dreher, A. (2009). IMF conditionality: Theory and evidence. Public 
Choice, 141(1/2), 233–267. www.jstor.org/stable/40270954
Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2013). Country or leader? Political 
change and UN General Assembly voting. European Journal 
of Political Economy, 29, 83–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ejpoleco.2012.10.002
Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2008). Does US aid buy 
UN General Assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis. Public 
Choice, 136(1/2), 139–164. www.jstor.org/stable/27698295
Dreher, A., & Sturm, J. (2012). Do the IMF and the World Bank 
influence voting in the UN General Assembly? Public Choice, 
151(1–2), 363–397. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9750-2
Fearon, J., & Wendt, A. (2002). Rationalism vs. constructivism: 
A skeptical view. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. Simmons 
(Eds.), Handbook of international relations (pp. 52–72). Sage.
Flores-Macías, G., & Kreps, S. (2013). The foreign policy conse-
quences of trade: China’s commercial relations with Africa 
and Latin America, 1992–2006. The Journal of Politics, 75(2), 
357–371. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000066
Fu, Y. (2013). Data analysis: Who votes with China, and who votes 
with the US and Europe at the UN? [Blog Post]. https://yiqinfu.
github.io/posts/united-nations-general-assembly/
Gartzke, E. (1998). Kant we all just get along? Opportunity, will-
ingness, and the origins of the democratic peace. American 
Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 1–27. https://doi.org 
/10.2307/2991745
Gartzke, E. (2000). Preferences and the democratic peace. 
International Studies Quarterly, 44(2), 191–212. www.jstor.
org/stable/3013995
Gartzke, E., & Dong-Joon, J. (2002, January). UN General 
Assembly Voting V3.0. http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/
14 SAGE Open
Glarbo, K. (2001). Reconstructing a common European foreign 
policy. In T. Christiansen (Ed.), The social construction of 
Europe (pp. 140–157). Sage.
Griswold, E. (2005, January 23). The next Islamist revolution? The 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/
Haas, P. M. (2018). Epistemic communities. In B. Badie, D. 
Berg-Schlosser, & L. Morlino (Eds.), International ency-
clopedia of political science (pp. 788–791). http://dx.doi.
org/10.4135/9781412959636.n189
Huntington, S. P. (1999). The lonely superpower. Foreign Affairs, 
78(2), 35–49. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Iida, K. (1988). Third world solidarity: The group of 77 in the UN 
General Assembly. International Organization, 42, 375–395.
Jones, T. C. (2011, June 10). Time to disband the Bahrain-based 
U.S. fifth fleet. The Atlantics. https://www.theatlantic.com/
world/
Kamal, M. R. (2013, March 25). Counter-terrorism: A Bangladesh 
perspective. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/
Kanwal, R. (2018, May 12). Interview with Dr Gowher Rizvi 
at India Today Conclave. https://www.facebook.com/
watch/?v=1934552586851718
Karlekar, H. (2005). Bangladesh: The next Afghanistan? Sage.
Kegley, C., & Hook, S. (1991). U.S. foreign aid and U.N. voting: 
Did Reagan’s linkage strategy buy deference or defiance? 
International Studies Quarterly, 35(3), 295–312. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/2600701
Keohane, R. (1967). The study of political influence in the General 
Assembly. International Organization, 21(2), 221–237. www.
jstor.org/stable/2705667
Kim, S., & Russett, B. (1996). The new politics of voting align-
ments in the United Nations General Assembly. International 
Organization, 50(4), 629–652. www.jstor.org/stable/2704240
Kumar, S. (2017, April 27). Hasina defrosting India–Bangladesh 
ties. The East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/
Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and 
international alliances, 1816-1992. The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 44(2), 203–227. www.jstor.org/stable/174663
Lazer, D. (2005). Regulatory capitalism as a networked order: The 
international system as an informational network. The ANNALS 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
598(1), 52–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204272590
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: 
The organizational basis of politics. Maxwell Macmillan 
International.
Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The false promise of international 
institu tions. International Security, 19(3), 5–49. https://doi.
org/10.2307/2539078
Newcombe, H. (1976). National patterns in international organi-
zations. Peace Research Institute.
Nye, J. S. (2002). The paradox of American power: Why the world’s 
only superpower can’t go it alone. Oxford University Press.
Office of the High Commissioner, United Nations Human Rights. 
(2017, December 20). Myanmar refuses access to UN Special 
Rapporteur. https://www.ohchr.org
Palmer, G., Wohlander, S., & Morgan, T. (2002). Give or take: 
Foreign aid and foreign policy substitutability. Journal of 
Peace Research, 39(1), 5–26. www.jstor.org/stable/425255
Pattanaik, S. S. (2005). Internal political dynamics and Bangladesh’s 
foreign policy towards India. Strategic Analysis, 29(3), 395–
426. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2005.12049816
Pauls, S. D., & Cranmer, S. J. (2017). Affinity communities in 
United Nations voting: Implications for democracy, coopera-
tion, and conflict. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its 
Applications, 484(15), 428–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
physa.2017.04.177
Perry, A. (2002, October 14). Deadly cargo. Time Magazine. http://
content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,364423,00.
html
Pevehouse, J. (2004). Interdependence theory and the measurement 
of international conflict. The Journal of Politics, 66(1), 247–
266. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00150.x
Rai, K. B. (1972). Foreign policy and voting in the UN General 
Assembly. International Organization, 26(3), 589–594. www.
jstor.org/stable/2706133
Riaz, A. (2019). The Indo-Bangladesh relationship: “Saath Saath” 
(together) or too close for comfort? Indian Politics & Policy 
Journal, 2(1), 53–76. https://doi.org/10.18278/inpp.2.1.4
Riggs, R. E., Hanson, K. F., Heinz, M., Hughes, B., & Volgy, T. 
J. (1970). Behavioralism in the study of the United Nations. 
World Politics, 22(2), 197–236.
Russett, B. M. (1967). International regions and the international 
system. Rand McNally.
Schaefer, B. D., & Kim, A. B. (2018, October 5). The U.S. should 
employ foreign aid in support of U.S. policy at the UN (Paper 
No. 3356). The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.
org/
Signorino, C., & Ritter, J. (1999). Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring 
the similarity of foreign policy positions. International Studies 
Quarterly, 43(1), 115–144. www.jstor.org/stable/2600967
Stone, R. W. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending. The 
American Political Science Review, 98(4), 577–592. https://
doi.org/10.1017/S000305540404136X
Thacker, S. (1999). The high politics of IMF lending. World 
Politics, 52(1), 38–75. www.jstor.org/stable/25054100
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2001). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, fifty-sixth ses-
sion, 2001/02. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2002). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, fifty-seventh 
session, 2002/03. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/
general-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2003). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, fifty-eighth 
session, 2003/04. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/
general-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2004). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, fifty-ninth ses-
sion, 2004/05. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2005). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixtieth ses-
sion, 2005/6. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/general-
assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2006). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-first ses-
sion 2006/07. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2007). The 




United Nations Department of Public Information. (2008). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-third ses-
sion 2008/09. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2009). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-fourth 
session 2009/10. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/
general-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2010). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-fifth ses-
sion 2010/11. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2011). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-sixth ses-
sion 2011/12. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2012). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-seventh 
session 2012/13. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2013). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-eighth 
session 2013/14. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2014). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, sixty-ninth ses-
sion 2014/15. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/general-
assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2015). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, seventieth ses-
sion 2015/16. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/general-
assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2016). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, seventy-first ses-
sion 2016/17. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/general-
assembly
United Nations Department of Public Information. (2017). The 
index to proceedings of the General Assembly, seventy-second 
session 2017/18. https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/gen-
eral-assembly
United Nations General Assembly. (2003, December 17). 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 
2003 (Confidence-building measures in the regional and 
sub-regional context, A/RES/58/43). https://undocs.org/
pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/58/32
United Nations General Assembly. (2005, March 23). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 8 March 2005 (A/
RES/59/280). United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning. 
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/59/280
United Nations General Assembly. (2007, March 13). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on December 2006 (Situation 
of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/RES/61/232). https://undocs.
org/en/A/RES/61/232
United Nations General Assembly. (2008a, February 28). 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 
2007 (Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, A/RES/62/167). https://undocs.org/pdf? 
symbol=en/A/RES/62/149
United Nations General Assembly. (2008b, February 28). Resolu-
tion adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 2007 
(Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/RES/62/222). 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/
generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_62_215.pdf.
United Nations General Assembly. (2009a, February 24). 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 
2008 (Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, A/RES/63/190). https://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_63_184.pdf
United Nations General Assembly. (2009b, January 23). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2008 
(Situation of human rights in Myanmar, A/RES/63/245). 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/
generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_63_241.pdf
United Nations General Assembly. (2010, March 26). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2009 
(Situation of human rights in Myanmar, A/RES/64/238). 
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/64/235
United Nations General Assembly. (2011a, March 21). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2010 
(Situation of human rights in Myanmar, A/RES/65/241). 
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/65/255
United Nations General Assembly. (2011b). Sixty-sixth session, 
93rd plenary meeting, 24 December 2011 [Official records]. 
https://undocs.org/en/A/66/PV.93
United Nations General Assembly. (2012, April 3). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2011, 
agenda item 69 (c) (Situation of human rights in Myanmar, A/
RES/66/230). https://undocs.org/A/RES/66/230
United Nations General Assembly. (2013, February 12). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2012, 
agenda item 69 (c) (Situation of human rights in the Syrian 
Arab Republic, A/RES/67/183). https://undocs.org/en/A/
RES/67/183
United Nations General Assembly. (2015, January 28). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2014 
(Entrepreneurship for development. A/RES/69/210). https://
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/gen-
eralassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_69_229.pdf
United Nations General Assembly. (2017a, December 11). 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 
December 2017 (Taking forward multilateral nuclear dis-
armament negotiations, A/RES/72/31). https://undocs.org/
en/A/RES/72/31
United Nations General Assembly. (2017b, December 12). 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December 
2017 (Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: Accelerating 
the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, A/
RES/72/39). https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/72/39
United Nations General Assembly. (2018a, January 23). Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2017 
(Situation of human rights in Myanmar, A/RES/72/248). 
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/a/res/72/266
United Nations General Assembly. (2018b). Seventy-third session, 
65th plenary meeting, 21 December 2018 [Official records]. 
https://undocs.org/en/A/73/PV.65
United Nations General Assembly. (2020, February 25). Report 
of the special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
16 SAGE Open
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/43/58). 
https://www.ohchr.org
U.S. Agency for International Development. (2018). U.S. over-
seas loans and grants (Greenbook). https://catalog.data.gov/
dataset/u-s-overseas-loans-and-grants-greenbook/
U.S. Department of State. (2000). Report to Congress on vot-
ing practices in the United Nations. Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/
index.htm
U.S. Department of State. (2002). Patterns of global terrorism 
2001. https://www.state.gov/
U.S. Department of State. (2008). Voting practices in the United 
Nations 2007. Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/index.htm
Vaughn, B. (2013). Bangladesh: Political and strategic develop-
ments and U.S. interests. Congressional Research Service. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41194.pdf
Voeten, E. (2004). Resisting the lonely superpower: Response of 
States in the UN to US Dominance. Journal of Politics, 66(3), 
729–754. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00274.x
Voeten, E. (2013). Data and analyses of voting in the UN General 
Assembly. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2111149
Walt, S. M. (1998). International relations: One world, many the-
ories. Foreign Policy, 110, 29–46.
Wang, T. (1999). U.S. foreign aid and UN voting: An analysis 
of important issues. International Studies Quarterly, 43(1), 
199–210. www.jstor.org/stable/2600971
Wendt, A. (1994). Collective identity formation and the international 
state. American Political Science Review, 88(2), 384–396.
Zaman, R. U. (2017, September 1). Can Bangladesh turn its burden-
some geography into a blessing? East Asian Forum. https://
www.eastasiaforum.org/
Zimmermann, R. (1993). Dollars, diplomacy and dependency—
Dilemmas of U.S. economic aid. Lynne Rienner.
